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TORTS-INTF.RSPOUSAL

IMMUNITY-UNLIQUIDATED

TORT CLAIMS

BETWEEN SPOUSES No LONGER BARRED-PENNSYLVANIA
'ABROGATES DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
AS UNSUPPORTED BY LAW, LOGIC,
OR PUBLIC POLICY.

Hack v. Hack (Pa. 1981)
On May 27, 1971, Judith Mazzochetti was injured in an automobile
accident while a passenger in a car driven by Joseph Steven Hack. 1
Mazzochetti and Hack were later married on May 18, 1972.2 On April
26, 1973, Judith Hack filed an action in trespass for damages incurred
as a result of the personal injuries she sustained.3 The Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County granted Joseph Steven Hack's
motion for a summary judgment 4 because the parties were married at
the time the action was commenced and, therefore, the doctrine of
interspousal immunity barred Judith Hack's suit. 5 The Superior Court
affirmed without opinion. 6 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed,7 holding that the judicially created doctrine of interspousal immunity was outdated and abolished in Pennsylvania. Hack
v. Hack, - Pa. -, 433 A.2d 859 (1981).
1.Hack v. Hack, - Pa. -, -, 433 A.2d 859, 860 (1981). The owner of the
car was Joseph Steven Hack, Sr. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 860. The car was insured by the Government Employees Insurance Company. Id.

2. Id.
3. Id. In her complaint, Judith Mazzochetti Hack averred that the injuries
were solely the result of Joseph Steven Hack's negligence. Id. Judith Hack
claimed that she had sustained fractured ribs, damage to her teeth, impairment
of the use of her elbow, and severe emotional distress. Complaint, averment
no. 7 at 2, Hack v. Hack, No. 73-05091 (Montg. County Ct. filed April 26, 1973).

4. Hack v. Hack, No. 73-05091 (Montg. County Ct. December 27, 1977),
afl'd, 104 Montg. Co. L.R. 106 (1978).
5. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 860. In particular, the court held the action
to be barred by DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973).
- Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 860. For a discussion of DiGirolaino, see notes 44 &

52-61 and accompanying text infra.

6. Hack v. Hack, 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 437, 395 A.2d 985 (1978).
7. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 869. Judith Hack argued on appeal that her
husband, Joseph Steven Hack, Jr., had waived the defense of interspousal immunity. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 860. The plaintiff asserted that her husband's
answer had been filed after their divorce and remarriage and that the answer
set forth only the first marriage (now dissolved but in existence at the time the
action was commenced), not the second marriage (the only marriage in existence
at the time the answer was filed). Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 860. Because her
husband had alleged only the first marriage and did not plead the second, Judith
Hack contended that her husband had waived the defense. Id. The Hacks
were divorced after the action was commenced, but were remarried prior to the-

(432)
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The ' doctrine of interspousal immunity, which barred actions at
8
law between a husband and wife, had its origins at common law. . At
its inception, the doctrine was justified by the legal fiction of the unity
of husband and wife. 9 Under this fiction, marriage merged the separate
county court's hearing of the case. Id. Mrs. Hack asserted that even if 'the
court found no waiver, there is no interspousal immunity where the marriage
does not continue in effect throughout the litigation process. Id.
8. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 at 859-60 (4th ed. 1981); 1 F.
HARPER AND F. JAMES, TORTS § 8.10 at 643-46 (1956). Under the common law,
a married woman had no capacity to contract. Lowell v. Daniels, 68 Mass. (2
Gray) 161 (1854); see also McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses,
4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 303-05 (1959). A married woman had no capacity to sue
or be sued, but she did, jointly with her husband, acquire a right of action for
torts to her person. Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156, 158-59 (1866). Thus, if a
right or a liability was substantively the married woman's, the action was
brought in the joint names of husband and wife. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair
Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 A. 454 (1911). Because a married woman lacked
capacity to contract with third persons or to sue or be sued in her own name,
she could not contract with or sue or be sued by her husband. Jewell v. Porter
& Rolfe, 31 N.H. 34 (1855). See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1032 (1930).
For two articles written by Professor McCurdy which deal with problems
in interspousal litigation, see McCurdy, PersonalInjury Torts Between Spouses,
supra; McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage of
the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. REv. 447 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Property Torts Between Spouses].
For the views of commentators on the interspousal immunity doctrine, see
Gedid, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsylvania, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 475 (1980);
Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FORUM 82 (1972); Haglund,
Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife (pts. 1 & 2), 27 GEo. L.J. 697, 893
(1939); Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in
American Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 307 (1967); Kahan-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REv.
133 (1952); Kleinfelter, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsylvania: A Concept in
Evolution, 69 DICK. L.' REv. 143 (1965); Miller, Liability of a Husband for
Wife's Torts, 18 IOWA L. REV. 30 (1932); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the
Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956); Comment, Limitations on Personal Injury
Tort Litigation by Married Persons in Community Property States: Interspousal
Immunity and the Community Property Classification of Personal Injury Recovery, 11 IDAHO L. REv. 225 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Interspousal Immunity and Community Property]; Comment, Toward Abolition of
Interspousal Tort Immunity, 36 MONT. L. REv. 251 (1975); Note, 8 U. BALT.
L. REv. 584 (1979).
The marriage relationship also affected other rights at common law. For
example, one spouse had the privilege of precluding the other from testifying
against him or her. J. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 161-63
(1972). In Pennsylvania, a spouse's evidentiary privilege is guaranteed by statute
in criminal cases. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 §§ 5913-15 (Purdon 1981). The
spousal testimonial privilege also applies to civil cases. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
42 §§ 5924-26 (Purdon 1981).
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 859-60. The legal unity fiction also justified the existence of the tenancy by the entirety. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 95-98 (1975). The tenancy by the entirety is an estate
created between husband and wife by which they both hold title to the whole
estate with a right of survivorship, so that upon the death of either spouse, the
surviving spouse takes the whole to the exclusion of the deceased spouse's heirs.
Id.
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legal identity of the woman with that of her husband, and for the
duration of the marriage they were legally one person-the husband.10
Because of this single legal identity, a husband and wife were precluded
from both contracting with or bringing suit against one another. 1
This preclusion from suit was characterized in two ways. 12 Some courts
concluded that as a matter of substantive law, due to the legal unity
of husband and wife, personal torts could not be committed between
14
spouses.'s Other courts based the immunity on procedural grounds.
These courts held that although an action for personal torts can exist
between spouses, a spouse is procedurally disqualified from bringing suit
due to his or her marital status. 15

10. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0442. As Blackstone stated: "By
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." Id. See also
W. PROSSER, supra note

8, at 859.

11. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 860. The immunity doctrine did not
differentiate between the sexes; that is, both wives and husbands were barred
from suing each other, because under the unity fiction a married couple became
one person, the husband, and no person can sue himself. Id. at 859-60.
12. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 8, at 141. One commentator has noted
that the classification of the immunity as either substantive or procedural can
determine the outcome of the litigation in certain situations. See Comment,
Offenses and Quasi.Offenses-.InterspousalImmunity-Right of Wife to Sue Husband's Estate, 35 TUL.L. REv. 272, 273-74 (1960).
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 272-74.

See, e.g., Phillips v. Barnet, [18761

1 Q.B.D. 440; Wenman v. Ash, 13 C.B. 836, 139 Eng. Rep. 1432 (C.P. 1853).
14. Comment, supra note 12, at 273-74.
15. See, e.g., Burke v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 647 (La. App.
1944); Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170, 173 (1863). One commentator has submitted
that the choice in characterizing the doctrine as either procedural or substantive
would determine whether a spouse could sue the other spouse's estate for torts
committed during their marriage. Comment, supra note 12, at 274. Under the
substantive classification, no cause of action ever arose. Id. Consequently, the
spouse's death could not revive it. Id. Under the procedural view, because
the substantive bases for the action did exist, the bar against suit would be
removed upon the spouse's death. Id.
In Pennsylvania, the courts have adopted the procedural approach and
have held the disability to be removed upon the death of a spouse. Johnson
v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958). In
Johnson, the court allowed a widow to sue the executor of her husband's estate.
Id. at 125, 145 A.2d at 720. The executor contended that because of the legal
unity fiction, the wife was "without any cause of action." Id. at 120, 145 A.2d
at 718. The Johnson court disagreed, stating that the tortious conduct of a
husband which injures his wife results in a cause of action which, for reasons
of public policy, is unenforceable during marriage. Id. at 121, 145 A.2d at 718.
The court in Johnson also noted that the "[djanger to marital happiness and
harmony.arises not from the existence of a cause of action arising from the
[interspousal] tort, but rather from its enforcement." Id.at 122, 145 A.2d
at 719.
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The unity fiction, however, soon developed exceptions. A married
woman could sue her husband in equity in order to protect her own
property from waste or misuse by her husband.' 6 This exception to the
unity of husband and wife could be easily circumvented and provided
little real protection for the property rights of the married woman.' 7
Furthermore, actions in equity did not provide a married woman with
a remedy for her husband's tortious conduct toward her.' s
The widespread enactment of the married women's acts in the nineteenth century undermined severely the conceptual foundation for the
doctrine of interspousal immunity.' 9 These acts, inter alia, granted
16. See, e.g., Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 169 A.2d 51 (1961) (suit in
equity to compel husband to account for funds held in tenancy by the entirety);
Brobst v. Brobst, 384 Pa. 530, 121 A.2d 178 (1956) (wife's suit in equity for relief
including an accounting and an injunction against husband's removal of trees
and collection of rents from realty held in tenancy by the entirety). Accord,
Geary v. Geary, 338 Pa. 385, 12 A.2d 23 (1940) (action by husband permitted
to recover possession from wife of three life insurance policies). See McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 8, at 1035-36. For an
excellent discussion of the development of a wife's separate estate in equity,
see McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses, supra note 8, at 450-51.
17. See McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses, supra note 8, at 452.
A husband could convey his legal interest to a bona fide purchaser for value
and defeat equity to the extent of that value. Id. Additionally, the wife's
rights were enforceable only in equity. Id. Also, as a wife's services and earnings were not, by themselves, part of her equitable estate, she had no remedy
in either law or equity against her husband's misappropriation of them. Id.
See Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 334, 24 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Ch. 1734). A wife's
action in equity was also of limited value because an equitable action can only
prevent future misconduct. Equity gave no damages ?or past abuse, and left
the wife without recourse if the husband destroyed or stole all of her property
before she acted. See, e.g., Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 383 Pa. 424, 427, 110
A.2d 87, 89 (1956) (a spouse may bring an action in equity for a preliminary
injunction to enforce rights in a tenancy by the entirety); Mower v. Mower,
367 Pa. 325, 328, 80 A.2d 856, 858 (1951) (court of equity compelled recording
of a deed to husband and wife by the entirety and prospectively restrained sale
or encumbrance of the premises by the husband). Most importantly, the idea
of a wife's separate estate in equity did not apply to property acquired by her
before or after marriage unless "designated for her sole and separate use free of
her husband's use and control." McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses,
supra note 8, at 452. In particular, the property had to be designated expressly
by the donor as solely the wife's property. See id.
18. McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses, supra note 8, at 452. Because they were aware of their limitations, equity courts recognized certain
intentional conduct, such as cruel and inhuman treatment, as a ground for
separation or divorce. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 860 &cn.18; Comment,
Lewis v. Lewis: Dissolving the "Metaphysical" Merger in Interspousal Torts,
12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 333, 336 n.2 (1976).
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 861. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons
in Domestic Relation, supra note 8, at 1036-37. See generally W. McCuRnY,
CASES ON PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1927). Although the acts gave
specific legal rights to married women, some courts still held the unity fiction
to exist. See Saunders v. Hill, 57 Del. 519, 202 A.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1964). But
see, e.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206, rehearing denied, 181
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married women separate legal identities and gave them the common
law rights of single women. 20 It became apparent that thelegal fiction
of the unity of husband and wife, the very fiction upon which the
21
doctrine rested, was no longer a completely, valid legal concept.
Therefore, the courts found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the
28
unity fiction 22 with the evolving rights of married women.
After passage of the married woman's acts, the courts of the various
states differed in their interpretation of the acts' effect upon the doctrine
of interspousal immunity.24 Some state courts construed the married
women's statute as evidencing the intent of the legislature to abolish
the legal unity fiction and to permit interspousal suits without exception. 25 In contrast, other courts, concluding that the legislature had
N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1920) (the unity doctrine was not statutory but an inference drawn by courts in a barbarous age).

For a collection of the statutes known generically as the married women's
acts, see 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, §§ 167, 179, 180 (1935). For a

discussion of the typical provisions of the married women's acts, see Haglund,
supra note 8, at 704-31 & 893-922. For a complete study and discussion of
the various statutes as enacted in the fifty states and England, see McCurdy,
PersonalInjury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 8, at 310-13.
One commentator has classified the married women's acts into seven groups.
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 8, at 1037.
The groups are: 1) those acts dealing with property, but silent as to remedies;
2) those statutes permitting suit only in respect to property constituting the
wife's separate estate; 3) those acts expressly excluding interspousal suits; 4)
those acts denying suit by or against a married woman in her own name alone
for personal torts; 5) those statutes permitting a wife to sue separately for torts
committed against her; 6) those acts which allow suits as though the married

woman was a feme sole; and 7) those acts which permit interspousal suits. Id.

20. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, supra note 8,
at 1036-37; Comment, Interspousal Immunity and Community Property, supra
note 8, at 233-34.

21. See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970)

("[a]lthough the original basis for the common law immunity doctrine was the
theory of legal identity of husband and wife, this metaphysical concept cannot
be seriously defended today"); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d
771, 774 (1972) ("[m]odern realities do not comport with the traditional 'supposed unity' of husband and wife").
22. See Gedid, supra note 8, at 477. The doctrine has been heavily criticized because its origin and rationale appear to rest on the outmoded metaphysical concept that the wife merges into the husband upon marriage and
loses her status as a separate entity. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, supra note 8, at 1031-35; Comment, supra note 12, at
337-38; Comment, Toward Abolition of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 36 MONT.
L. REV. 251 (1975).
23. Note, Interspousal Immunity-Time for a Reappraisal,27 OHIo ST. L.J.

550, 553 (1966) (footnote omitted).
24. Comment, supra note 18, at 337-38.
25. See, e.g., Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 44, 187 N.W.2d 236, 238 (1971)
(statute providing that "[a]ctions may be brought by and against a married
woman as if she were unmarried" held to allow wife's suit against husband for
negligence); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95, 97 (Alaska 1963) (statute giving
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implicitly incorporated the doctrine in the married women's acts by
not expressly abolishing the doctrine, sustained the continuing validity
of the immunity.26 A third group of courts held that the enactment of
the married women's acts had no effect on the doctrine of interspousal
immunity in the absence of a clear legislative intent to change the law. 27
Reasoning that interspousal immunity was judicially created, this group
of courts concluded that the doctrine remained a part of the common
28
law until specifically abrogated by the legislature.
married woman the right "to prosecute and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and property as if she were unmarried"
construed to allow wife to sue husband for negligent tort committed during
marriage); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 23, 46 P.2d 740, 743 (1935) (statutes
giving wife right to sue "in all matters having relation to her property, person,
or reputation, in the same manner as if she were sole," and to "sue, and be
sued in all matters, the same as if she were sole," construed to allow wife to
sue husband for negligence); Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 338, 140 So. 378,
379 (1932) (statutes authorizing wife to sue in her own name "for the recovery
of her separate property" and defining "all damages which the wife may be
entitled to recover for injuries to her person or reputation" as "her separate
property" construed to allow wife to sue husband for negligence).
For an example of one state's statutory abrogation of the doctrine, see
Micu. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2001 (1981). In that act, entitled the Revised
judicature Act, the state legislature expressly abandoned the interspousal immunity principle by providing that "[a]ctions may be brought by and against a
married woman as if she were unmarried." Id.
In contrast, the courts of Iowa found implicit retention of the doctrine by
the legislature in Iowa's married women's act. See Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa
547, 552, 133 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1965). The Iowa statute provides:
Should the husband or wife obtain possession or control of property belonging to the other before or after marriage, the owner of the
property may maintain an action therefor, or for any right growing
out of the same, in the same manner and extent as if they were
unmarried.
IOWA CODE § 597.3 (1981).
26. See, e.g., Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 552, 133 N.W.2d 907, 910
(1965) (court found no clear abrogation in the Iowa married women's act);
Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1950) (court found no clear provision
extending a married woman's rights to include a suit against her husband in
tort); Plotkin v. Plotkin, 32 Del. 455, 459, 125 A. 455, 457 (1924) (court determined that statute must be construed strictly and no right can be claimed unless
it was expressly granted).
27. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
28. See, e.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 399, 528 P.2d 1013, 1014
(1974) ("[h]aving been created and preserved by the courts, the doctrine [of
interspousal immunity] is subject to amendment, modification and abrogation
by the courts if current conditions so dictate"); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601,
602, 506 P.2d 345, 346 (1973) (statute stating that "[a] married woman shall sue
and be sued as if she were unmarried" was assumed by the court not to have
incorporated the doctrine); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 185, 500 P.2d
771, 773 (1972) ("[t]he rule of interspousal immunity or disability is of common
law origin, court made and court preserved"); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind.
16, 22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972) ("[t]he doctrine is a creation of the common
law and is therefore judicially created"); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191,
193, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1971) (married women's statute did not abolish the
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The courts that continue to uphold the doctrine formulated several
theories to justify the retention of the interspousal immunity principle. 29.
These theories include: the preservation of domestic peace and felicity; 30
the fear of collusive lawsuits; A' the avoidance of frivolous and trivial
claims; 82 and the notion that spouses had alternative remedies available
to them in divorce or criminal proceedings.83
immunity doctrine, and therefore it remained a common law rule which could
then be reviewed in light of current needs); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488,
267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) (after considering existing case law, the court concluded that it was "free to determine whether the reasons behind the immunity
[were] present in the case before [it]"); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 689, 376
P.2d 65, 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1962) ("[i]mmunity exists only by statute or
by reason of compelling dictates of public policy. Neither exists here.").
29. Comment, Tort Liability Within the Family Area-A Suggested Approach, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 610, 611-12 (1956).
30. See Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936). In
Kaczorowski, both the husband and wife died in an automobile accident. Id.
at 439, 184 A. at 663. The sole surviving parent of the wife sued the administrator of the husband's estate for negligence. Id. at 439, 184 A. at 663-64.
After concluding that interspousal tort actions were barred by the Pennsylvania
version of the married women's act, the court in Kaczorowski set forth two
policy reasons in support of the doctrine: 1) the legal unity fiction, and 2) the
policy of preserving harmony within the home. Id. at 442-43, 184 A. at 665.
The court characterized the domestic harmony policy as "a more compelling
theory to account for the continued prohibition upon suits for personal torts
between husband and wife which, in large degree, has superseded the reason of
fictional unity of husband and wife." Id. at 443, 184 A. at 665.
31. See Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965). In

Lyons, the court faced the question of whether one spouse could "maintain an
action for personal injuries resulting from the negligence of the other spouse,
where the parties were married and living together as husband and wife at the
time of the alleged injury." Id. at 244, 208 N.E.2d at 535. After declaring
that the state's public policy is to promote marital harmony and to prevent
fraud and collusion, the court in Lyons stated that "[t]here is the real danger
of fraud or collusion between the spouses in such suits against each other,
where insurance is involved." Id. at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 535. In particular, the
Lyons court noted that in interspousal tort suits where insurance is involved,
the married couple does not bear the risk of loss; instead, both spouses will be
benefited by a decision against the defendant. Id. at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 535-36.
The court then observed that the chance for financial gain would create "a
strong inducement to trump up claims and conceal possible defenses." Id. at
245, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
32. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910) (construction of
a married women's act to allow interspousal tort suits would "open the doors
of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other"). Cf.
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (denying an injunction
against nagging), expressly overruled by Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373
n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969) (completely abrogating the interspousal
immunity doctrine). But see Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 545, 138 N.W.2d
343, 345 (1965) ("fear of frivolous suits hardly seems to be a realistic one").
33. See Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924). In Austin, a
wife sued her husband for injuries received from his allegedly negligent operation of an automobile. Id. at 61, 100 So. at 591. The Austin court determined
that "[t]he divorce courts and the criminal courts furnish ample redress to the
husband and wife for such wrongs as this." Id. at 63, 100 So. at 592.
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Pennsylvania courts have construed the state's Married Woman's
Act" as incorporating the doctrine of interspousal immunity.ss In the
seminal Pennsylvania case of Miller v. Miller,6 the court held that a
wife could not bring an action against her husband for tortious conduct
despite the existence of a married woman's separate equitable estate 7
At least one commentator has criticized the alternative remedies theory on
the dual grounds that the criminal law does not compensate victims and that
divorce is a drastic remedy which also does not compensate an injured spouse.
Comment, supra note 18, at 355.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1981). Section 111 provides:
Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly, in all
respects, and in any form of action, and with the same effect and results and consequences, as an unmarried person; but she may not sue
her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceeding to
protect and recover her separate property; nor may he sue her, except
in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceeding to protect or recover
his separate property; nor may she be arrested or imprisoned for her
torts.
Id.
In construing the derivatives of the Pennsylvania Married Women's Act,
the Pennsylvania courts have focused on whether the statutory language "her
separate property," which was kept in each version of the act, includes tort
claims by a wife against her husband. Gedid, supra note 8, at 483. See notes
86-61 and accompanying text infra.
35. See notes 36-61 and accompanying text infra.
36. 44 Pa. 170 (1863).
37. Id. at 171-72. In Miller, a wife brought an action of covenant against
her husband. Id. at 170. The wife alleged that she had entered into an
antenuptial contract with her husband by which she conveyed a parcel of land
to him and he was obliged to keep the realty in good repair. Id. The wife
alleged that he had "permitted waste and destruction" of the land. Id. The
court noted that the damages sought were unliquidated damages which "are not
'property,' either in common parlance or technical language." Id. at 171-72.
Because unliquidated damages are not property, they could not fall under the
narrow statutory category of "her separate property." Id. See note 29 supra.
Second, the court applied an argument of negative implication in construing
the married women's act involved in the case before it. 44 Pa. at 182. See
note 22 and accompanying text supra. In particular, the court in Miller noted
that if the legislature had intended to grant to married women a capacity to
maintain a suit as if each were a feme sole, it could have done so expressly;
because it did not do so, the legislature impliedly intended to leave married
women in their less than equal status. 44 Pa. at 182.
The Miller court also noted that the married women's statute should be
treated as a "remedial statute," that is, one which grants relief to an oppressed
party. Id. The court, however, stated that the .statute should be strictly, rather
than liberally, construed because "it countervails a great common law principle,
which makes the husband and wife one, and overturns a salutary rule of public
policy, which prohibits and discourages all litigation between husband and
wife." Id. In defense of this strict construction of the act, the Miller court
expressed its fear that given the temporary aspects of marital disputes and the
fact that abolition of the immunity doctrine will encourage interspousal litigation, interspousal suits "will become perpetual, and . . . of much more frequent
occurrence." Id.
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and the passage of the Married Woman's Act. n8 In interpreting the
Married Woman's Act, the Miller court construed the phrase "her
separate property" contained in the Act 39 as not including unliquidated
damage claims. 40 The court reasoned that as tort claims were not
"property," a married woman could not bring suit for them under
4
the Act.
The retention of this specific phrase in all amendments to the Act
has led the courts of Pennsylvania to consistently deny the right of one
spouse to sue the other in tort.42 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court implied that the fiction of the unity of husband and wife is no
longer valid,43 it has, citing the Pennsylvania Married Woman's Act,
1

38. PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1981).

For the text of the statute,

see note 34 supra.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1981).
40. 44 Pa. at 171-72.
41. Id.
42. For cases citing Miller for the proposition that "separate property" does

39. PA.

not include unliquidated damage claims, see DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa.
557, 560-61, 312 A.2d 382, 384 (1973) ("[t]his Court . . . has consistently adopted

the view that unliquidated damages are not property within the meaning of
the statute"); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 549, 180 A.2d 772, 773 (1962) (dam-

age claims are not property within the meaning of the Act). But see Morrish

v. Morrish, 262 Pa. 192, 198, 105 A. 83, 85 (1918) (the legislature intended the

term "separate property" to be used in "a broad and comprehensive sense,"
and, therefore, real estate conveyed by the wife to the husband immediately
before marriage was her "separate property"); Walker v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa.
168, 173, 45 A. 657, 657 (1900) ("[t]he right of the wife in the first action, being

for a tort done to her, was her separate property by the express words of [the
Married Women's Act]").
43. See Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962). In Meisel, a
minor was injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 547, 180 A.2d at 773.
Subsequently, she married the driver of the car. Id. After the marriage, she
brought suit through her mother against her husband. Id. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's grant of a judgment on the pleadings
and refused to permit the wife to bring suit for an antenuptial tort. Id. at 550,
180 A.2d at 774. First, the court in Meisel characterized the interspousal immunity rule as "both statutory and decisional." Id. at 548, 180 A.2d at 773.
The court stated that the statutory term "property" did not include unliquidated tort claims, and thus the wife's claim was outside the scope of the Act.
Id. at 549, 180 A.2d at 773. In reaching its conclusion, the Meisel court conceded that the doctrine was no longer based on the unity of husband and wife,
but upon "social reasons and public policy." Id. at 548, 180 A.2d at 773.
In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Justice Musmanno proposed that the
abrogation of the immunity rule actually promoted family unity. Id. at 553,
180 A.2d at 775-76 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). Justice Musmanno maintained
that "payment of such a verdict by the insurance company, thus [would] promote, instead of disturb family unity." Id. at 553, 180 A.2d at 776 (Musmanno,
J., dissenting). Justice Musmanno also questioned whether an interspousal
tort suit is necessarily more disruptive than an interspousal contract action,
which is allowed in Pennsylvania. Id. at 554, 180 A.2d at 776 (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting). Turning to the statutory construction issue, Justice Musmanno
argued that "separate property" includes personal property, that personal property includes choses in action, that an unliquidated tort claim is a chose in
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44
continued to give effect to the interspousal immunity doctrine.

action, and, therefore, the right of a wife to sue her husband in tort is her
"separate property" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Married Women's
Act. Id. at 557-58, 180 A.2d at 778 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
44. See DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973). In
DiGirolamo,a woman was injured in an auto accident. Id. at 559, 312 A.2d at
383. Subsequently, she married the driver of the automobile. Id. Later, she
sued her husband in negligence for the damages incurred as a result of her
personal injuries. Id. The DiGirolamo court stated that by statute a married
woman could not sue her husband except in a few specified situations. Id. at
559-60, 312 A.2d at 383. The court then noted that one of the statutory exceptions was the grant of the right to "recover her separate property." Id. at
560, 312 A.2d at 383, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1965). The
DiGirolamo court then devoted most of its opinion to the construction of the
term "separate property." 454 Pa. at 560-62, 312 A.2d at 384. The court
concluded that the language "separate property" did not include an unliquidated damage claim, and therefore the Act barred the wife's action. Id. at 562,
312 A.2d at 384. In refusing to follow the decisions of other jurisdictions which
had abrogated the interspousal immunity rule, the court stated:
The difficulty, however, is the instant decision is controlled by a specific
state statute. It is the function of this Court to interpret statutes, not

rewrite them. If we were dealing with a rule promulgated in de-

cisional law, we would be free to re-examine the reasoning underlying
the rule, as well as the public policy considerations. However, we are
here confronted with a statute enacted by the legislature, and we cannot and should not interpose our views on public policy for those of
the legislature. The wisdom of a statutory provision is not for us
to say.
Id. at 563, 312 A.2d at 385.
Justice Manderino and Justice Roberts (joined by Justice Nix) filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 563, 312 A.2d at 385 (Manderino, J., dissenting); Id. at 574, 312 A.2d at 385 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Manderino
argued that the Married Women's Act violated the Pennsylvania Constitution
by permitting the legislature to deprive married women of "the opportunity to
redress a wrong." Id. at 574, 312 A.2d at 385 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Roberts asserted that the court should abolish the
interspousal immunity doctrine because it had interpreted erroneously the
Pennsylvania Married Women's Act and, in particular, the term "separate
property." Id. at 564, 312 A.2d 385-86 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts
then compared the language of the five versions of the statute and interpreted
broadly the words "separate property." Id. at 564-66, 312 A.2d at 386-87
(Roberts, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Roberts concluded that "a
married woman's tort claims and recoveries are her separate property," and
there has been no indication of a contrary legislative intent. Id. at 569, 312
A.2d at 388 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Justice Roberts also considered the "archaic policies underlying the doctrine
and their treatment by the courts of this and other states." Id. at 570, 312 A.2d
at 389 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). As to the legal unity fiction,
Justice Roberts stated that the widespread passage of the Married Women's Acts
had weakened severely the unity concept. Id. at 571, 312 A.2d at 389 (Roberts,
J., dissenting). Concerning the fear of collusive lawsuits, Justice Roberts contended that this fear did not warrant retention of the doctrine because "[c]ourts
are daily required to separate the artificial from the genuine." Id. Turning
to the policy of promoting domestic peace and felicity, Justice Roberts asserted
that it is the injury, not the suit, which ruptures domestic harmony. Id. at
571-72, 312 A.2d at 389-90 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts did not
consider the policy theories dealing with the avoidance of frivolous and trivial
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Support for the interspousal immunity doctrine, however, has been
less than absolute in Pennsylvania.4 5 In Koontz v. Messer,46 the court
ruled that the doctrine would not bar an action by a wife against her
husband's employer where the husband was later joined as an additional
defendant. 47 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Johnson v.
claims or the availability of alternate remedies. Id. at 563-74, 312 A.2d at
385-91 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts then addressed the constitutionality of the statute in question. Id. at 573-74, 312 A.2d at 390-91 (Roberts,
J., dissenting). Noting that the court's duty is to interpret statutes in favor of
constitutionality, justice Roberts stated that the court could fulfill that duty in
DiGirolamo by construing "separate property" to include a wife's tort claims.
Id. at 574, 312 A.2d at 391 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
45. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text infra.
46. 320 Pa. 487, 181 A. 792 (1935). In Koontz, a wife was injured as the
result of the negligence of her husband while he was engaged in the course of
his employment. Id. at 489, 181 A. at 792. The wife sued the company and
its president on a theory of respondeat superior; the defendant then joined
her husband as an additional defendant. Id. at 489, 181 A. at 792-93. The
court in Koontz held the action was not barred because the personal immunity
of the husband should not extend to his employer since the immunity is based
on a policy of preserving domestic peace and felicity. Id. at 493, 181 A. at 794.
47. Id. at 493, 181 A. at 794.

Koontz was reaffirmed by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court in 1965. Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523, 207 A.2d 412 (1965).

In Daly, a wife was injured while a passenger in an automobile operated by
her husband. Id. at 525, 207 A.2d at 412. Both instituted a joint action against
the driver of the car which had collided with them. Id. The other driver
secured a severance of the actions and impleaded the husband as an additional
defendant in the wife's action. Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the wife. Id. at 525-26, 207 A.2d at 412. The parties, the trial court, and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed the verdict as being against both
her husband and the other driver. Id. at 526 n.2, 207 A.2d at 412 n.2. The
judgment as entered provided, in part, "Judgment in favor of Nancy Daly
against Donald Daly, additional defendant, in the amount of the verdict $46,000
plus int. from date thereof October 18, 1962." Id. at 526, 207 A.2d at 413.
The Daly court reversed the judgment because under Pennsylvania law, a wife
"could have no recovery directly against her husband, although the latter is
joined as additional defendant." Id. at 529, 207 A.2d at 416, quoting Koontz
v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 494, 181 A. 792, 795 (1935). Instead, the Daly court
held that a wife could recover against the third party who, in turn, could recover against the husband by way of contribution. 416 Pa. at 529, 207 A.2d
at 416. In so holding, the Daly court specifically overruled Ondovchik v.
Ondovchik. Id. at 535, 207 A.2d at 417, overruling Ondovchik v. Ondovchik,
411 Pa. 643, 192 A.2d 389 (1963). Parenthetically, it should be noted that in
Ondovchik, the court allowed a wife to recover a jury verdict against her
husband alone. Ondovchik v. Ondovchik, 411 Pa. 643, 192 A.2d 389 (1963).
The Ondovchik court found that while a suit between spouses was clearly prohibited by statute and case law, a verdict for one spouse against the other had
not been dealt with by the courts of Pennsylvania. Id. at 647, 192 A.2d at 391.
Suit was not barred initially in Ondovchik because the injured woman sued an
individual who then joined her husband as an additional defendant. Id. at
645, 192 A.2d at 390. The plaintiff and Ondovchik married before the case was
tried, and the jury returned a verdict solely against Ondovchik. Id. The
Ondovchik court thus faced a situation where suit was not brought against a
spouse, the parties being unmarried when the action was commenced, but where
a verdict was returned against one spouse in favor of the other spouse. Id.
The court in Ondovchik allowed the wife to recover the jury verdict against
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Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co. 4 8 allowed a widow to maintain
a suit against the personal representative of her deceased husband. 4
In allowing the latter type of suit, the Johnson court reasoned that,
"[d]eath having terminated the marriage, domestic harmony and felicity
suffer no damage from the allowance of the enforcement of the cause of
action." 50 Thus, while direct suits between living spouses have been
prohibited, third party actions and suits against a spouse's estate have
been allowed.5 '
Recently, in DiGirolamov. Apanavage,5 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reaffirmed the interspousal immunity doctrine by holding that
unliquidated tort claims are not a wife's "separate property" 13 within
the meaning of the Married Woman's Act. 54 The court in DiGirolamo
set forth three reasons for its decision.5 5 First, the DiGirolamocourt noted
that unliquidated tort damage claims have consistently been viewed as
not falling within the statutory exception to the interspousal immunity
doctrine.58 Second, the court in DiGirolamo determined that a tort
damage claim is not property because it cannot be assigned.57 Third,
her husband alone, principally because the court concluded that neither Pennsylvania statutes nor case law prohibited a verdict between spouses, as distinguished from a suit. Id. at 535, 207 A.2d at 417.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania extended its holding in Daly in
Policino v. Ehrlich, 478 Pa. 5, 385 A.2d 968 (1978). In reinstating the wife's
judgment against her husband who had been joined as an additional defendant
and who had been found to be solely liable, the Policino court stated that the
Married Women's Act "does not bar an original defendant from joining a
husband as an additional defendant; rather, it precludes a wife's recovery from
her spouse." Id. at 9, 385 A.2d at 970, citing Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523,
207 A.2d 412 (1965). Thus, after Policino, a spouse could recover directly
against the other spouse if the defendant-spouse was joined as an additional
defendant by a third party. Policino v. Ehrlich, 478 Pa. 5, 385 A.2d 968 (1978).
Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
For a discussion of Johnson, see note 15 supra.
Pa. at 122, 145 A.2d at 719.
notes 45-50 and accompanying text supra.
52. 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973). See note 44 and accompanying text
48.
49.
50.
51.

394
Id.
394
See

supra.

53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1981). For the text of the current
statute, see note 34 and accompanying text supra. For Pennsylvania cases which
have construed the statute, see notes 35-51 and accompanying text supra and
notes 55-61 and accompanying text infra.
54. 454 Pa. at 560-63, 312 A.2d at 384-85.
55. Id. at 560-62, 312 A.2d at 384.
56. Id. at 560, 312 A.2d 384. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
57. 454 Pa. at 562, 312 A.2d at 384, citing Sensenig v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
229 Pa. 168, 78 A. 91 (1910); Manganiello v. Lewis, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 186
A. 218 (1936). For one commentator's criticism of Sensenig and of the idea
that unliquidated claims are not "separate property," see Gedid, supra, note 8,
at 485.
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the DiGirolamocourt asserted that the legislature had retained the immunity doctrine as to tort claims.6 s In supporting this conclusion, the
court reasoned that if tort damage claims were held to be property,59
then no interspousal suits could be barred.6 0 The DiGirolamo court
concluded that based on its finding that the legislature intended to
retain the doctrine, such a broad view of the statutory language was
unwarranted. 6 '
In recent years, however, a growing number of states have abolished
the doctrine.6 2 The courts in these states have employed two general
58. 454 Pa. at 561-62, 312 A.2d at 384.
59. Id. at 562, 312 A.2d at 384.

In particular, the DiGirolamo court reasoned

that if tort damage claims were held to be property, then every interspousal
suit would be to protect or recover "separate property" within the meaning of
the Married Women's Act. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon 1981).
For the text of the Act, see note 34 supra.
60. 454 Pa. at 562, 312 A.2d at 384.
61. Id. In determining the legislature's intent to retain the doctrine, the
DiGirolamo court looked only to the statute and existing case law, as no extrinsic evidence of the legislature's intent existed. Id.
62. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 901, 923-40 (1979). In abrogating
the doctrine, courts have given their decisions either retroactive or prospective
effect. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966). See Darrow v. Hanover Township, 58 N.J. 410, 278 A.2d 200 (1971) (limiting the decision abrogating the
doctrine to prospective effect only).
Prospective application of a decision abrogating the doctrine would begin
from the date of the decision. See Annet., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966). Retroactive application of an overruling decision has been extended to cases in which
final judgments had been entered before the date of the overruling decision,
limited to cases pending before the decision was reached, or given only to parties
of the case in which the doctrine was abrogated. Id. at 1397-98. In addition,
some courts, although mandating only prospective effect for their decisions, have
applied the new rule announced in the decision to the parties in the case before
them. See Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (abolition
of the interspousal immunity doctrine in actions for personal injuries resulting
from motor vehicle accidents applicable only to the instant case and future
causes of action arising after the date of the filing of the opinion in the
instant case).
The traditional view is that an overruling decision should be applied retroactively on the theory that the decision does not make new law but merely
corrects a previous misstatement of the law. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1382
(1966). In addition, where the courts have given warning to future litigants in
the form of statements that a rule should be abrogated, such notice provides
support for applying a decision retroactively. Id.
There are, however, valid reasons supporting the prospective application of
overruling decisions and specifically, those decisions abrogating intrafamilial
immunity rules. See id. at 1384-93. One commentator has noted that courts
abrogating the interspousal immunity doctrine have applied their decisions
prospectively because they have found justified reliance by defendants and their
insurers on the prior law. Greenstone, supra note 8, at 87. An additional
reason for prospective application is that it would allow insurers to investigate
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approaches in abrogating the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 63
Some courts have found the married women's acts to either expressly or
impliedly repudiate the doctrine.6 4 Other courts, considering the doctrine as part of the common law, reevaluated the four theoretical founda-

accidents and circumstances of the new cases while avoiding the problems of
investigating stale claims. Id. Greenstone also discussed another reason for
prospective application: the avoidance of attorney conflict of interest problems.
Id. These problems arose in pending cases where attorneys representing husband and wife against a third party now had to deal with cross-claims of one
spouse against the other because the doctrine had been abolished. Id. at 87-88.
To avoid the conflict of interest problem, this commentator recommended
prospective application of the decision. Id. at 87, citing Darrow v. Hanover
Township, 58 N.J. 410, 278 A.2d 200 (1971) (limiting the decision abrogating
the doctrine to prospective effect only).
In addition to these considerations supporting prospective application of
decisions abrogating the intrafamilial immunities, there are three other factors
which are considered by the courts in deciding whether to apply a decision
prospectively: 1) the ability to achieve the objective of the new rule without
retroactive operation; 2) the burden which retroactive operation would place
on the judicial system, and 3) the unconstitutionality of a retroactively applied
rule as an ex post facto law. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1390-93 (1966).
As an alternative to the use of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, one
commentator has suggested that the courts apply either an assumption of the
risk theory or a consent analysis as a bar to interspousal actions. Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1650, 1661-62 (1966). Under
the assumption of the risk theory, courts would view one spouse as assuming
the risk of the other's tortious conduct during the marriage. Id. Under the
consent analysis, courts would examine the facts of each case to determine
whether the injured spouse had in fact consented either expressly or impliedly
to the tortious conduct. Id. at 1661. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, supra note 8, at 1055.
As an alternative to completely abrogating the doctrine, some courts have
preserved a limited immunity for spouses based on the conclusion that the four
policy theories supporting the doctrine do have a certain limited validity. See
Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (where a husband participated
in the gang rape of his wife, the court abrogated the doctrine but limited abrogation to "outrageous intentional" torts because retention of the doctrine as to
other conduct served the policies behind the rule). Other courts have retained
the interspousal immunity doctrine while carving out an exception for all intentional torts. See Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345, cert. denied,
84 N.M. 592, 506 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1973) (husband who had intentionally
stabbed his wife should not be exempt from liability on the ground that he
vowed to love, cherish, and protect her). These courts reason that the policies
supporting the doctrine could not justify retaining the bar to intentional tort
actions. Id. Still other courts have created an exception for motor vehicle
negligence cases. See Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973) (wife
was permitted to sue for injuries sustained while riding as a guest in a car
negligently operated by her husband).
For the arguments of two commentators that the courts, rather than abrogating the doctrine entirely, should retain a limited immunity doctrine, see
Sullivan, Intra-Family Immunities and the Law of Torts in Ohio, 18 W. REs.
L. REv. 447 (1967); Note, Interspousal Immunity-A Policy Oriented Approach,
21 RUTGERS L. REV. 491, 511 (1967).
63. For a discussion of these approaches, see notes 24-28 and accompanying
text supra.
64. See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
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tions of the doctrine," and concluded that none have modern validity.6
Therefore, these courts have abolished the doctrine. 67
65. See Freehe v. Freehe, 71 Wash. 2d 183, 185, 500 P.2d 771, 773 (1972).
(court viewed the doctrine as a common law rule, and after considering the
policy reasons supporting it, completely abrogated the doctrine).
The four theoretical foundations of the doctrine are: 1) the preservation
of domestic peace and felicity; 2) the fear of collusive lawsuits; 3) the avoidance
of frivolous claims; and 4) the notion that spouses had alternative remedies
available in criminal or divorce proceedings. For a discussion of these theories,
see notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
66. See Freehe v. Freehe, 71 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
67. See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). In refuting the
domestic harmony argument and abrogating the rule as to automobile negligence
actions, the court stated that
[w]e are doubtful that the marital relationship will be any more disturbed by allowing a cause of action than by denying it. Where one's
conduct is such that his spouse elects to sue him, if there is no insurance, the damage probably has been already done. A person would
not sue his spouse if there were perfect harmony, and it is unlikely
that adjudication of the rights involved will worsen the relationship.
Id. at 488, 267 A.2d at 484. In refuting the other bases for the doctrine the
Immer court stated that:
[t]he presence of insurance militates against the possibility that the
interspousal relationship will be disrupted since a recovery will in most
cases be paid by the insurance carrier rather than by the defendant
spouse. In fact, it is ironic that the presence of insurance has spawned
the second rationale, i.e., that of protecting the insurance carriers
against fraud and collusion. That rationale belies the possibility that
domestic harmony will be disturbed since its very premise is that the
interspousal relationship is so harmonious that fraud and collusion
will result. Domestic harmony may be more threatened by denying a
cause of action than by permitting one where there is insurance coverage. The cost of making the injured spouse whole would necessarily
come out of the family coffers, yet a tortfeasor spouse surely anticipates
that he will be covered in the event that his negligence causes his
spouse injuries. This unexpected drain on the family's financial resources could likely lead to an interference with the normal family life.
And it is doubtful that this void in insurance coverage would comport
with the reasonable expectations of the insured that this Court has so
often sought to protect.
Id. at 489, 267 A.2d at 484-85.
One commentator has questioned whether promotion of domestic peace and
felicity is a proper matter for the courts and has charged that "[t]he rights and
obligations of the parties are of public concern; the pursuit of happiness is
their own business." Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARv.
L. REV. 1650, 1651 (1966). In addition to the arguments that the damage has
already been done before suit is brought and that the promotion of domestic
harmony is not a proper task for the courts, some courts have argued that if
domestic harmony did exist and if spouses could sue each other, then the couple
would pursue such an action only so long as it did not adversely affect their
relationship. Freehe v. Freehe, 71 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972).
If, on the other hand, domestic harmony did not exist, these courts would
argue that "the law's imposition of a technical disability [the interspousal immunity doctrine] seems more likely to be a bone of contention than a harmonizing factor." Id. One court has indicated that the widespread prevalence of
automobile liability insurance has obviated the danger that such an action
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Against this background, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Hack
v. Hack faced the question of whether interspousal immunity for personal injuries inflicted prior to or during marriage should remain the
would disrupt domestic harmony. Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d
637 (1973).
Concerning the fear of collusive lawsuits, the courts have recognized that
the threat of fraud is real, especially where liability insurance is present. See
Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978). In allowing interspousal suits in negligence, the Merenoff court stated that it was confident that
the judicial system could ferret out fraudulent claims from legitimate ones,
analogizing to the host-guest cases. Id. at 553, 388 A.2d at 960. Furthermore,
the Merenofi court declared that the courts "have at their command ample
means to cope with the real or asserted spectre of fraud in the context of
marital tort claims." Id. at 554, 388 A.2d at 961. The court in Merenoff then
suggested that courts could employ a high standard of care to counterbalance
the risk of collusion or impose a strict burden of proof matching the quantum
of fraud perceived in a particular case. Id.
In considering how insurers could protect themselves from collusive lawsuits, one court has suggested that insurance companies could employ the right
to disclaim liabiltiy if there is lack of cooperation by the insured. Sorenson v.
Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 364, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (1975) (abrogating. parental
tort immunity). At least one state has enacted a statute to protect insurance
companies from liability due to injuries to the property or person of a policyholder's spouse. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(3) (McKinney 1980). The statute
provides that no policy will be deemed to insure against such injuries "unless
express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." Id.
This exclusion of coverage applies only to situations "where the injured spouse,
to be entitled to recover, must prove the culpable conduct of the insured
spouse." Id. The purpose of the exclusionary clause was to prevent collusion
between spouses and, possibly, to protect insurers from increases in liability
without a proportional increase in premiums after abrogation of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. Perno v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 73 Misc. 2d
346, 348, 342 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301 (1973). See generally Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason versus
the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REV. 397, 401-02 (1954).
For a discussion of whether abrogation of the immunity doctrine leads to
an increase in the number of claims and, in particular, in the number of cases
of fraudulent claims, see McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses,
supra note 8, at 334-35.
Concerning the policy of avoiding the threat of trivial and frivolous lawsuits, one court responded to this policy by. stating: "The court should not
decline to entertain a meritorious action against a spouse . . . because of the
dubious apprehension that in some future case trifling domestic difficulties may
become the subject of litigation." Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d
70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962) (abrogating the interspousal immunity
doctrine as to negligence), quoting Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 241, 317
P.2d 613, 632 (1957) (Schauer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
At the same time, the Klein court responded to the argument about a flood of
such trivial claims by stating succinctly that "[w]e have not been informed that
such result has followed in any of the 18 states that have repudiated the old
rule." Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102,
104 (1962).
To meet the threat posed by frivolous and trivial claims, one commentator
has suggested that the courts simply hold "that there is consent to the ordinary
everyday irritations of marriage, or bar the claim under an assumption of the
risk analysis." Gedid, supra note 8, at 497-98 (footnote omitted). In that
article, the commentator also asserted that the danger posed by trivial claims
is "purely imaginary, because in those jurisdictions where abrogation of inter-
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8
law in Pennsylvania.6
Declining to address arguments based on the
unique factual situation of the case, 609 the Hack court refused to create
exceptions to "an outmoded and unwarranted doctrine." 70 Instead,
stating that "a tortfeasor's immunity from liability because of his marital
relationship with the injured party cannot be sustained on the basis of
law, logic, or public policy," 71 the Hack court unequivocally abolished
72
the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Pennsylvania.
In its decision, the Hack court pointed out that prior Pennsylvania
decisions upholding the doctrine of interspousal immunity had erroneously construed the statutes relating to the rights of married women
and had "adhered to outmoded common law concepts." 73 Specifically,
the Hack court stated that the earlier decisions had overlooked relevant
statutory provisions and legislative history. 74 The court in Hack con-

spousal immunity has occurred, there has been no flood of trivial litigation."
Id. at 498 (footnote omitted).
Concerning the notion that spouses have alternative remedies available in
criminal or divorce proceedings and therefore should be barred from suing
each other in tort, one court responded that criminal proceedings and actions
for separate maintenance were "adequate to prevent future wrongs but they
certainly do not compensate for past injuries." Courtney v. Courtney, 184
Okla. 395, 401, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (1938) (reaffirming the judicial abrogation of
the doctrine of interspousal immunity). But see note 33 and accompanying
text supra.
At least one commentator has charged that the remedies provided by criminal and divorce proceedings are not only non-compensatory but also do not
cover all torts which might occur between spouses. Gedid, supra note 8, at 498.
68. - Pa. at -, 483 A.2d at 860.
69. Id. Judith Hack argued on appeal that the doctrine of interspousal
immunity was not applicable to the instant case for two reasons. Id. First,
she contended that her husband had waived the defense because his answer to
the complaint had pleaded only their first marriage (which ended in divorce),
not their subsequent remarriage which existed at the time the answer was filed.
Id. Second, Judith Hack asserted that even if the pleadings were proper and
there were no waiver, the doctrine should not be applied where the marriage
does not continue in effect throughout the litigation. Id. The court noted
that adoption of either argument would prevent the application of the doctrine
as a defense in the instant case. Id. See note 7 supra. The court, however,
also observed that reliance on either argument would skirt the issue of whether
the doctrine should be abolished in Pennsylvania. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 860.
70. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 860.
71. Id. at

-,

433 A.2d at 860-61.

72. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 861. The court in Hack did not state whether
its decision was to be applied retroactively or prospectively. Id. at -, 433
A.2d at 859.
73. Id. More specifically, the Hack court charged that two Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decisions incorrectly interpreted the statutory language, "separate property." Id. The two decisions questioned were DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973), and Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546,
180 A.2d 772 (1962). For a discussion of those cases, see notes 43, 44 & 52-61
and accompanying text supra.
74. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 859.
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duded that the Married Woman's Act, 75 read in the light of related
enactments, 7 6 guaranteed the right of a married woman to bring an
interspousal tort action. 77 Thus, the Hack court determined that the
legislature intended the statutory language "separate property" to in78
dude a claim for damages in tort.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 11l (Purdon 1965). For the text of the statute,
see note 34 supra.
76. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 862. The two related enactments discussed
by the Hack court were the first Married Persons Property Act and a supplementary act addressing the property and contract rights of married women. Id.
The first Married Persons Property Act provides, in pertinent part:
Every species and description of property, whether consisting of
real, personal or mixed, which may be owned .by or belong to any
single woman, shall continue to be the property of such woman, as
fully after her marriage as before; and all such property of whatever
name or kind, which shall accrue to any married woman during coverture, by will, descent, deed of conveyance or otherwise, shall be owned,
used and enjoyed by such married woman as her own separate
property ....

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 64 (Purdon 1981). Subsequent amendments to this act
extinguished the statutory requirement that a wife's consent be obtained when
she joins her husband in conveying his real estate. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 67 (Purdon 1981).
The supplementary act concerning the property and contract rights of
married women provides:
Hereafter, a married woman shall have the same right and power
as a married man to acquire, own, possess, control, use, convey, lease
or mortgage any property of any kind, real, personal, or mixed either
in possession or in expectancy, or to make any contract in writing or
otherwise, and may exercise the said right and power in the same
manner and to the same extent as a married man.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 9- 32.1 (Purdon 1981). Because the two statutes were
emancipatory in nature and because the Married Woman's Act was intended to
effectuate those two statutes, the Hack court concluded that the Married
Woman's Act included the right to bring an action in tort. - Pa. at -, 433
A.2d at 862.
77. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 862. In reaching its conclusion, the Hack
court considered the various versions of the statute. Id. After examining all
three statutes, the court in Hack found that an unliquidated tort damage claim
qualified as a wife's property under these statutes. Id. The court then determined that the amendments to the Married Women's Act have merely abbreviated the provisions describing what property a wife could sue to recover, to
the words "separate property." Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 863. Hence, because an
unliquidated tort claim was originally included as part of the wife's property
and because there was no evidence of a contrary legislative intent, the Hack
court concluded that the statute allowed interspousal actions on the grounds
that they were simply actions to recover the wife's "separate property." Id.
78. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 864. The Hack court, in reaching its conclusion,
looked to the "remedial purpose" of the statute, and viewed that purpose as
dictating an expansive, rather than a restrictive reading of any ambiguity in
the statute. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 863. In defending its expansive reading
of the statute, the Hack court noted that a married woman may maintain an
action in equity to protect and recover her separate property. Id. at -, 433
A.2d at 863-84. For the rule concerning a wife's separate estate in equity and
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The court then considered the doctrine of interspousal immunity
in the context of each of the four theories which have traditionally been
employed as justifications for the doctrine. 79 The court declared that
the first policy reason, the legal unity fiction,80 was not a legitimate
reason for retaining the immunity doctrine because the purpose of the
married woman's statute was "to establish a wife's separate legal identity
and capacity." 81 Similarly, the Hack court reasoned that the domestic
harmony justification of the doctrine was invalid.82 Although a direct
suit was not permitted,83 an aggrieved spouse might nonetheless achieve
the same objective-damage recovery from the other spouse-through an
indirect suit.84
In support of its assertion of the invalidity of the domestic harmony
theory, the Hack court noted that interspousal contract and conversion
actions have been permitted,85 and that these actions are likely to be
more disruptive of the marital relationship than a negligence action.8,
her rights to protect it against her husband, see notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of a wife's rights in equity, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
79. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 865-67.

See notes 29-33 & 67 and accompany-

ing text supra. The Hack court, however, did not consider the theory that an

injured spouse has adequate remedies available in divorce or criminal proceedings which would eliminate the necessity of creating interspousal tort remedies.
For a discussion of this theory, see notes 33 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
80. For a discussion of the legal unity fiction, see notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
81. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 864. The Hack court also noted that although
prior decisions in Pennsylvania had not abrogated the doctrine, these decisions
had viewed the legal unity fiction as obsolete. Id., citing Meisel v. Little, 407
Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962); Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958). For a discussion of Meisel, see note 43 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Johnson, see notes 15 & 48-49
and accompanying text supra.
82. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 865-66.

83. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 865.
supra.

See notes 45-51 and accompanying text

84. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 865. For a discussion of indirect interspousal
suits, see notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra. The court in Hack then
criticized the doctrine because, in effect, it allows the presence or absence of a
third party to control the rights and remedies of spouses inter se and because,
if the domestic harmony theory were valid, the doctrine would be absolute rather
than qualified. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 865. The Hack court did not address
the argument that once an injury has occurred and the injured spouse desires
to bring suit, there is no domestic harmony worth preserving and that barring
the action might exacerbate the marital rift.
85. - Pa. at -,

433 A.2d at 866.

86. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 866. The Hack court claimed that contract and
conversion actions may be more disruptive than negligence actions because
they "typically involve allegations of intentional wrongdoing and are not covered
by insurance." Id.
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Finally, the court in Hack observed that the facts of the case before it
belied "any theory that interspousal tort litigation is inherently conducive to family disharmony.",8 7
After concluding that none of the doctrine's underlying theories
were persuasive,88 the Hack court strongly asserted that it had the "full
authority, and the corresponding duty" 89 to depart from precedent in
order to insure that rules bereft of their analytical basis are not perpetuated.9 0 Thus, the Hack court abolished the defense of interspousal
immunity as a bar to tort actions in Pennsylvania91
In analyzing the decision in Hack v. Hack,92 it is noted that Pennsylvania has joined the growing number of states which have completely
abrogated the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity9 3 In achieving
this result, however, it is submitted that the Hack court had to overrule
directly prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpretations of the
87. Id. The Hack court based its observation on three reasons. First,
although the parties were divorced nearly 16 months after the action was begun,
the court stated that "the record does not indicate that the divorce was in any
respect caused by marital discord resulting from the litigation." Id. Second,
the court reasoned that the remarriage of Judith Hack and Joseph Hack during
the litigation indicated "that-the present action has not affected their marital
felicity." Id. Third, the Hack court noted that the defendant spouse was
indemnified by insurance, and, hence, there was no reason to believe that the
action would adversely affect the marriage. Id.
The Hack court then considered whether the interspousal immunity doctrine prevented the bringing of collusive suits and trivial claims. Id. at -,
433 A.2d at 866-67. In refuting the argument that interspousal immunity prevents the bringing of collusive suits, the Hack court stated that this theory was
"analytically inconsistent with the previous argument that tort litigation will
disrupt family harmony," and "wholly speculative." Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 866.
Furthermore, the Hack court found that the solution to the problems posed
by collusive or trivial suits between spouses "is not to prohibit all claims including the meritorious, but rather to rely on the judicial process to deny both
the fraudulent and the frivolous." Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 867.
88. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 867.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Hack court noted that it had abandoned or abrogated rules
in the past based on changing policy and social reasons. Id. Cases where
Pennsylvania courts have abolished immunity from suit include: Mayle v. Pa.
Dep't of Hwys., 479 Pa. 8, 388 A.2d 709 (1978) (sovereign immunity); Ayala v.
Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (local governmental
immunity); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (parental immunity); Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (charitable
immunity).
91. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 869. In abolishing the defense, the Hack
court rejected the statutory and policy arguments supporting the doctrine. Id.
at -, 433 A.2d at 861-67.
92. - Pa.
93. Id. at
(1979).

-,
-

433 A.2d 859.
433 A.2d at 869 (Appendix).
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Married Woman's Act 94 which had supported the application of the
doctrine.9 5 The Pennsylvania cases supporting interspousal immunity
had justified their decision on what historically were considered sound
public policy rationales. 96 However, notwithstanding their long use,
it is submitted that the validity of these rationales was always questionable. 97 It is submitted that the real reason for the overly long use of

the immunity was the judicial reluctance to overrule a doctrine that
was superficially based on a concern for family values. 98 Thus, without
careful analysis, the Pennsylvania courts sought instinctively to support
a doctrine which purported to uphold marital harmony. 99
However, it is submitted that modern developments, in particular
the legal and societal emancipation of women, have strained the validity
of both the doctrine's underlying policies and the strength of the judicial
aversion to such actions.' 0 0 It is asserted that the quantum of this stress
reached a compelling point in Hack.'0 '
In considering whether the rule in Hack will be applied retroactively or prospectively, 10 2 it is noted that the case was remanded for
94. For the text of the Pennsylvania Married Woman's Act, see note 34
supra. For a discussion of the judicial interpretation of the Act, see notes
34-44 & 52-61 and accompanying text supra.
95. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania cases, see notes 34-61 and accompanying text supra.
96. For a discussion of the policy theories supporting the doctrine, see notes
29-33 and accompanying text supra. The original foundation of the interspousal immunity rule was the legal unity fiction. For a discussion of the legal
unity fiction, see notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra. As the married
women's statutes were intended to create a separate legal identity for wives,
the unity fiction was completely dissolved as a foundation for the doctrine.
See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that the courts,
in order to replace the unity fiction, formulated four policy theories to justify
retention of the doctrine. See note 29 supra.
For a general discussion of the four policy theories, see notes 29-33 & 67
and accompanying text supra.
97. For a discussion of the arguments of the courts and commentators rejecting the validity of the four policy theories, see note 67 and accompanying
text supra. It is submitted that modem developments, such as the widespread
prevalence of liability insurance and the increasing enjoyment by women of
rights previously reserved to men have further strained the validity of the four
policy theories. See notes 19-23, 67 & 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
98. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, supra
note 8, at 1035-37.
99. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania decisions upholding the interspousal immunity doctrine, see notes 34-61 and accompanying text supra.
100. For a discussion of the invalidity of the doctrine's underlying policies,
see note 67 supra.
101. See Hack v. Hack, - Pa. -, 433 A.2d 859 (1981). It should be noted
that the Hack court stated that "interspousal tort immunity is premised upon
outmoded legal theories unsupported by today's social conditions and public
policy and hence has no justification in contemporary society." Id. at -, 433
A.2d at 868.
102. For a general discussion of the retroactive or prospective application
of an overruling decision, see note 62 supra.
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trial to be held in accordance with the court's decision in Hack.
Thus, although the Hack court was silent as to its intent, the remanding
order indicates that the court intends the abolition of interspousal immunity to be applied retroactively. 1°4
In considering the impact of the Hack decision, it is suggested that
the experience of other jurisdictions which have discarded the immunity
indicates that the courts of Pennsylvania will see neither a flood of
frivolous claims nor an increase in the number of collusive lawsuits.'05
It is also suggested that insurance rates are not likely to be affected
significantly by the Hack decision because insurers and spouses could
However, it is
employ exclusion clauses in the insurance policy. 10
conceivable that Hack may have ramifications beyond the express hold1 07
ing of the case and affect the legal status of the marital unit.

The

law provides the institution of marriage and married persons with
special protection. 10 8 It is suggested that the reasoning of the court in
Hack will make it difficult for future courts to justify spousal testimonial
privileges 109 and special spousal property rights."10
103. - Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 869.

104. Id. It is strongly contended that retroactive application limited to
the date of the original filing would be a more reasonable application of the

Hack decision for two reasons. First, it is suggested that spouses and insurance
companies may well have relied on the established case law prior to the Hack
decision. See Darrow v. Hanover Township, 58 N.J. 410, 278 A.2d 200 (1971).

Arguably, such reliance was reasonable as there was no indication that the immunity doctrine would be abrogated. See notes 34-61 and accompanying text
supra. Second, it is suggested that limited retroactivity would avoid the problem of uncovering stale evidence which is inherent in cases of unlimited retroactivity. See note 62 supra.
It is submitted that a convenient date to define the retroactive application
of Hack would be the date of the filing of the original complaint, April 26,
1973. See - Pa. at -, 443 A.2d at 860. For a discussion of the retroactiveprospective question, see note 62 supra.
105. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. As to the threat of trivial
claims, it is suggested that the Hack court implied that the judicial system
could separate the trivial from the substantial claim in a case-by-case analysis.
- Pa. at -, 433 A.2d at 867.
106. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. Also, for a discussion of
how insurers could protect themselves without increasing insurance rates, see
note 67 supra. Even if an insurance rate increase does occur, the state legislature can protect insurers from liability for injuries due to interspousal torts
(or due to fraudulent claims). See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
Thus, it is suggested that even if rates do increase due to the abrogation of the
immunity doctrine, that effect could be countered and reduced by statutory
action. N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(3) (McKinney 1980), as discussed in note 67 supra.
107. See notes 109 & 110 and accompanying text infra.
108. See notes 8 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
109. The testimonial privilege in civil cases is set forth at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 42, §§ 5924-26 (Purdon 1981). The testimonial privilege in criminal cases
is set forth at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5913-15 (Purdon 1981). The arguments
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However, Hack does not suggest complete abandonment of judicial
protection for the family. Hack only signifies that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will look closely at age-old justifications for such protection. Our society's concept of the "family" is undergoing rapid
change. The fresh and unfettered reasoning of the Hack court is a
necessary step in the evolution of judicial attitudes which must stay
abreast of the needs of the modern family.
James Russell Wells
in favor of the privilege are the dangers to society of public disclosure of marital relations and a judicial reluctance to encroach on the sanctity of the marriage relationship. See J. McCoRmicK, supra note 8 at 161-62. It is suggested
that the Hack decision will support the abolition of this privilege because the
effect of the decision will be to increase interspousal suits, requiring the disclosure of interspousal communications, and because the court in Hack abandoned its former view of the sanctity of the marriage relationship.
110. See note 9 supra. In particular, it is contended that the legislature
may abolish tenancy by the entirety in Pennsylvania. It should be noted that
tenancy by the entirety rests on the legal unity fiction. J. CRIBBET, supra note
9, at 95. It is submitted that the Hack decision completely dissolved that
fiction. Because the tenancy by the entirety in Pennsylvania is now bereft of
a justifying foundation, it is submitted that the legislature might abolish this
form of property interest.
It is also contended that Hack will be employed to attack the validity of a
surviving spouse's right to an intestate share of the decedent spouse's estate.
See generally Comment, Rights of the Surviving Spouse Under the Pennsylvania
Wills and Estates Statutes, 9 Duq. L. REv. 230, 240 (1970). A surviving spouse's
right to an intestate share of the decedent's estate is based on a desire to secure
the position of the surviving spouse. Id. Given the Hack court's recognition
that spouses should be treated as equal and independent, it is suggested that
the Hack decision may influence the legislature to repeal this special protective
provision. For the text of this provision, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2102
(Purdon 1981).
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